Litigation in Texas Re: The Edwards Aquifer and Water Rights by Caroom, Douglas G.
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Uncovering the Hidden Resource: Groundwater 
Law, Hydrology, and Policy in the 1990s 
(Summer Conference, June 15-17) 
1992 
6-16-1992 
Litigation in Texas Re: The Edwards Aquifer and Water Rights 
Douglas G. Caroom 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/groundwater-law-hydrology-policy 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Environmental Health and Protection Commons, Environmental Law 
Commons, Judges Commons, Litigation Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Natural 
Resources Management and Policy Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, Water Law 
Commons, and the Water Resource Management Commons 
Citation Information 
Caroom, Douglas G., "Litigation in Texas Re: The Edwards Aquifer and Water Rights" (1992). Uncovering 
the Hidden Resource: Groundwater Law, Hydrology, and Policy in the 1990s (Summer Conference, June 
15-17). 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/groundwater-law-hydrology-policy/20 
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment 





Douglas G. Caroom, Litigation in Texas Re: The 
Edwards Aquifer and Water Rights, in UNCOVERING THE 
HIDDEN RESOURCE: GROUND WATER LAW, HYDROLOGY, AND 
POLICY IN THE 1990S (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of 
Colo. Sch. of Law 1992). 
 
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson 
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the 
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law 
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School. 
 
LITIGATION IN TEXAS
RE: THE EDWARDS AQUIFER AND WATER RIGHTS
DOUGLAS G. CAROOM
BICKERSTAFF, HEATH & SMILEY







A summary of Texas groundwater law is necessary in order to fully appreciate the current
controversies over the Edwards Aquifer.
A. Groundwater or underground water is water located under the surface of the land. The term can
include percolating water, underground flow in confined channels, artesian water, and stream
underflow. Groundwater is presumed to be percolating, unless proven otherwise.
Texas, unlike most other western states, has a general regulatory program for only surface water,
not groundwater. In Texas, surface water is considered property of the state, while underground
water is considered the property of the owner of the surface estate and treated much like a
mineral or oil and gas.
B. The "Rule of Capture" prevails for the use of underground water.
(1) In Houston & T.C. Railway Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904), the Texas
Supreme Court adopted the English common law rule of Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W.
324, 152 E.R. 1223 (Ex. 1843), that the owner of land might pump unlimited quantities
of water from under his land, regardless of the impact that action might have upon his
neighbor's ability to obtain water on his own land. Neither an injunction nor damages
will lie to prevent such action.
(2) The Comanche Springs case, Pecos County WCID No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503
(Tex. Civ. App. -- El Paso 1954, writ refd n.r.e.), applied the principles of the East
case to the effect of groundwater uses of surface water supplies. The plaintiff, a statutory
senior appropriator of surface water, complained that defendant's well had reduced
springflow of Comanche Springs to such an extent that insufficient water was available
for irrigation. The court ruled that the plaintiff's right to use the water attached only
after the water emerged from the ground. Prior to such emergence, the defendant could
use any amount of water he chose, regardless of the impact upon others.
(3) Groundwater need not be used on the premises of the surface estate. It may be sold for
off-site use by a third party. Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273 (1927).
The use of groundwater at a distant location, even though the majority may be lost in
transportation, is permissible. In City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex.
289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955), the Texas Supreme Court approved Corpus Christi's
transportation of artesian well water 118 miles down surface watercourses to its diversion
point, even though at times as much as two thirds to three fourths of the original supply
was lost in transit to evaporation, seepage, and transpiration.
(4) In the Kickapoo Springs case, Denis v. Kickapoo Land Company, 771 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.
App. — Austin 1989, writ den'd), an identifiable cavity (located 13 feet "upstream" of
the spring orifice) did not qualify as un underground stream, nor did the fact that
spriniflow made a sufficient addition to streamflow to be of benefit to downstream
riparian owners.
C.	 Limitations and Exceptions to the General Rules on Groundwater Use.
(1) Underflow of watercourse - "Underflow" is that portion of the flow of a surface
watercourse occurring in sand and gravel deposits beneath the surface of the bed of the
stream. Texas Co, v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273. It is hydrologically
connected to the surface flow of the stream. Underflow is considered to be property of
the state and the principles governing allocation and use of surface water apply. Tex.
Water Code Ann. §11.021 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
(2) Underground streams in defined channels -- The principles discussed above (Paragraph
I,B) apply to percolating underground water. Other western states have distinguished
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between subterranean streams and percolating water, applying surface water principles
to subterranean streams. 1 S.C. Weil, Water Rights in the Western States §1077 (3d ed.
1911). Importance of the distinction in Texas is uncertain. The rule of law for
subterranean streams is not clear. No case has yet presented the issue squarely. Such
a strong presumption exists, however, that groundwater is percolating water (Texas Co, 
v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 196 S.W. 273; Pecos County WCID No. 1 v. Williams, 271
S.W .2d 503;) that the question may be largely academic.
(3) Artesian Water -- Artesian water is groundwater confined under pressure by an
impermiable geologic layer, capable of flowing to the surface without the necessity of
pumping. Principles applicable to percolating water have been applied by Texas courts
to artesian water. The only significant distinction is the existence of statutory provisions
prohibiting the waste of artesian water. Texas Water Code §§11.201-11.207.
(4) Restrictions on pumping percolating water -- Only two significant limitations exist on the
landowner's right to capture and use percolating water. First, it cannot be done
maliciously with the purpose of injuring a neighbor or amount to wanton and wilful waste
of the resource. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d at 801.
Second, since 1978 an action for damage would lie for negligent pumping of groundwater
which caused subsidence of neighboring land. Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-
Southwest Industries. Inc. , 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex. 1978).
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PART ONE: IN RE: THE ADJUDICATION OF RIGHTS TO WATER IN THE EDWARDS
AOUIFER; CAUSE NO. 89-0381; IN THE HAYS COUNTY DISTRICT
COURT
General Overview:
The parties named by the Guadalupe-Blanco-River-Authority in their suit are itself, Texas Water
Commission (TWC), Texas Parks & Wildlife Department (TPWD), and all those who own a well or who
pump water from the Edwards, including municipal and industrial agencies.
The Original Petition, filed by GBRA, seeks relief through the District Court such that the State
of Texas, through TWC, would regulate diversions from the Edwards in order to protect and maintain
adequate flows from the Comal and San Marcos Springs. GBRA claims, for reasons to be outlined later,
that the Edwards is an underground river and thus owned by the State of Texas in trust for the benefit
of the public. Once the court enters declaratory judgment to that effect, GBRA further seeks an
	
adjudication of all claims of rights to divert and use the State's water from the Edwards. This would
	
(Th
mean that current users (pumpers) from the Edwards would no longer have valid rights under law to
divert and use water, and they would have to seek the necessary rights by applying for water
appropriation permits from TWC.
GBRA's stated needs for judicial action are as follows:
(1) withdrawals from the Edwards, before the water reaches the Comal and San Marcos
Springs, are massive and unregulated, and have an adverse impact on spring flows
(specifically in Cqmal and San Marcos);
(2) during 1984, well withdrawals reached approximately 530,000 acre-feet (173 billion
gallons), and the number of wells, currently at 800, is increasing and is unregulated;
(3) increased pumping from wells has a progressively adverse effect on the Comal & San
Marcos Springs (during the worst drought of record from 1950-56, the Comal dried up
pm
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for about 5 months in 1956), and studies have shown that should past droughts recur, the
Comal and San Marcos Springs could both dry up;
(4)	 and finally, this interruption of natural flow from either Springs, even briefly, will cause
severe environmental and economic damage in the Guadalupe River Basin.
In response to GBRA's notice of the suit, sent to all industrial and municipal well owners, over
200 defendants (including landowners, municipalities, agencies, Cities of San Antonio, Lytle, New
Braunfels, Uvalde County, and several businesses) filed answers. Besides general and specific denials,
defenses asserted include arguments that, as a matter of law, the Edwards has already been determined
to be underground water, separation of powers, political question, taking of private property, and failure
to join all necessary parties.
From a factual viewpoint, differing views on how the Edwards Aquifer should be classified (as
underground water or an underground stream) depends upon the perception the parties have of the
physical attributes of the Aquifer. In order for the Edwards to qualify as an underground river it must
posses all the characteristics of surface watercourses. These include: well-defined banks; well-identified
specific sources of supply; a well-identified specific destination; a significant current of water compared
to surface watercourses; it or a portion of it must be identified as the location of a well-defined and
known underground channel; and it must posses the same characteristics as a surface-water course. While
GBRA contends that the Aquifer does possess these characteristics, the defendants deny the assertion,
considering the Aquifer to be a rather complex underground storage reservoir.
The suit forced governmental entities to choose sides.
TWC and TPWD filed their Original Answers on 9/20/89 maintaining neutrality on the
underground river issue, but giving an idea of what their responsibilities would be should the court
declare Edwards Aquifer an underground river or stream. TWC volunteered to be the agency primarily
responsible for implementing the court's decision and for continued regulation and supervision of the
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Aquifer. TPWD volunteered to be responsible for protecting the State's fish and wildlife resources,
	 /Th
including endangered and threatened plants and animals. Both would enforce water quality control
regulations to the extent aquatic life and wildlife are affected.
It is interesting to note that at this point, TWC declares its neutrality: later it takes a much more
aggressive and politically charged stance.
On 9/20/89, the Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD) intervened based on its perceived
special interest regarding the conservation, protection and recharge of the Edwards Aquifer. (EUWD
is a conservation and reclamation district created by the Texas Legislature in 1959 to conserve, protect
and recharge the underground water-bearing formations, and to prevent waste and pollution of the
underground water.) In its original answer, it denied that the Edwards Aquifer is an underground river,
that it is a tributary of any river and that it is owned by the State of Texas and therefore subject to
regulations by TWC.
History of the Case;
GBRA filed its Original Petition on 6/15/89. In response, several hundred well owners or
effected parties answered or intervened.
On 8/17/89, the United States Army and Air Force filed a Notice of Removal, removing the
GBRA suit to the US District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division. A few days
later, the court appointed a Special Master to this case due to its complexity and far reaching implications
for water users. Agricultural interests, on 9/14/89, filed to have the case remanded to state district court.
During this time, other defendants were filing their original answers. On 11/20/89, the State, in a letter
to Judge Nowlin, requested that the case be remanded to state court for its stare decisis effect.
On 10/18/89, the Special Master denied all motions to have the case remanded back to the
District Court. By the end of October, 1989, the trial date was set for 4/23/90.
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In reversal of the Master's ruling, on 11/22/89, Judge Nowlin abstained from exercising
jurisdiction, remanded the case to state court, ruled that federal immunity had been waived, and released
the Special Master. He stated that the most persuasive reason for his action was "the political question".
The Texas Constitution showed a commitment for its legislature to formulate policy for the State's water
resources, and pursuant to this, the Texas Legislature promulgated the Texas Water Code and delegated
its responsibility for managing the State's water to TWC. The Legislature also created EUWD to manage
the Edwards Aquifer, and in 1988, a drought management plan was approved and adopted by EUWD
with the protection of Comal and San Marcos listed as a goal. However, it stopped short of stating
measures to be taken to prevent Comal from going dry, and Nowlin declared that federal court did not
wish to decide a question which it seems the Texas Legislature had made at least partial provision for
answering.
Judge Nowlin ordered the case remanded to state court, on Burford abstention grounds. See
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 63 S.Ct. 1098 (1943). The federal defendants had filed a motion for dismissal
as defendants, on grounds of sovereign immunity; they appealed the refusal of the district court to dismiss
them. Appellees argued in response that if Judge Nowlin had erred, it was in failing to have returned
the case to state court on mandatory remand grounds (which would have resulted in a statutory preclusion
of federal defedants' appeal), rather than on discetionary (abstention) grounds.
While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided another case involving removal under
similar circumstances. It held that the express terms of the removal statute did not authorize removal by
federal agencies, but only federal officers who had been sued for actions taken by them under color of
office. See Int'l Primate Protection League v. Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 111  S.Ct. 1700
(1991). Since the removal in this case was by federal defendant agencies (Army and Air Force) who had
no right of removal under the statute, on August 2, 1991, the Fifth Circuit vacated Judge Nowlin's order
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with instructions to remand the case to state court on mandatory (28 U.S.C. 1446(c)) grounds for
	 cm
failure of subject matter jurisdiction. No action has been taken in the case since that time.
PART TWO: SJ_E_MIIY,AUB LI_Thlitt; CAUSE NO. MO-91-CA-069; IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
MIDLAND/ODESSA DIVISION
General Overview:
On May 17, 1991, the Sierra Club filed a complaint against Manuel Lujan, Jr. in his official
capacity as Secretary, Department of the Interior, and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. It
alleges that defendants have failed to properly restrict withdrawals of water from the Edwards Aquifer
in violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). This alleged failure leads to withdrawals at such a
rate that Comal and San Marcos Springs will cease flowing entirely, or will flow at rates so inadequate
that the San Marcos Gambusia, Fountain Darter, and Texas Wild Rice (all endangered species), and the
San Marcos Salamander (threatened) that live at and downstream of the springs will be destroyed.
Plaintiffs request that defendants be enjoined to restrict withdrawals from the Edwards at any time
the instantaneous spring flow from the Comal Springs measured at the Comal gauge is less than 350 cubic
feet per second, thereby preserving endangered/threatened species at and downstream of the two springs.
Plaintiffs also request that defendants be ordered to develop and implement a recovery plan as required
by the ESA.
Much of the Sierra Club's initial motion is very similar to GBRA's initial motion "In Re:
Adjudication of Rights to Water In the Edwards Aquifer". The Sierra Club lists five counts showing
defendants' violations of the ESA by not complying with the prohibition against the taking of any listed
wildlife species. The definition of "take" as per the ESA is to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct". This can include significant




behavioral patterns (such as breeding, feeding, sheltering). The Sierra Club alleges that defendants have
failed to enforce the ESA and to ensure adequate water levels in the Edwards and natural springflows in
the Comal and San Marcos Springs. Also, by failing to enforce the ESA, defendants have 'taken'
endangered and threatened species. The Sierra Club claims that defendants must enforce the provision
of the ESA by ensuring instantaneous natural spring flow at Comal of about 350cfs. They also claim that
the Secretary of the DO! (Lujan) failed to carry out his duty to perform non-discretionary acts eg: to
develop and implement recovery plans for conservation and survival of endangered and threatened species
under the ESA.
The relief requested by the Sierra Club and Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority is truly mind-
boggling from the viewpoint of an underground water user. The Sierra Club requests that springflow
from Comal Springs be maintained at a level of 350cfs. Any springflow discharge less than this amount,
the Sierra Club argues, will result in a degradation of the habitat of Fountain Darters in the vicinity of
the upper springs outlets at Coma! Springs. This habitat degradation amounts to a "taking" of the
Fountain Darters which must be prohibited under the terms of the Act.
To put the 350cfs minimal flow into perspective, one need only recall that Comal Springs went
dry during the drought of the 1950s. Thus, even the aquifer pumpage levels existing in the mid 1950s
were too much of a demand on the aquifer to allow maintenance of the springflows during an extremely
serious drought. Thus, if the Court grants the relief requested by the Sierra Club, total aquifer pumpage
must be reduced to less than 25% of its current level.
History of the Case. 
On 8/12/91, the defendants filed an answer denying such allegations. Agricultural interests filed
a motion on the same date to intervene as a defendant (since any limitation on groundwater withdrawals
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imposed as a result of Plaintiff's complaint would affect their farming operations). It was granted a week
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later. Two days later, the court issued a scheduling order setting the trial date for 12/23/91.
Other parties intervening as plaintiff included the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, the City of
San Marcos, the City of New Braunfels and New Braunfels Utilities, and the State of Texas on behalf
of the Texas Water Commission and the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department.
GBRA, even more than the Sierra Club, appears to be the motivating force behind the litigation.
If not working directly with the Sierra Club, GBRA has provided at least substantial assistance, both with
the notice of suit and pleadings.
New Braunfels and San Marcos, two central Texas municipalities, depend upon Comal Springs
and San Marcos Springs respectively, for significant environmental, recreational and economic benefits
to their communities.
Intervention by the State of Texas (TWC and TPWD) as plaintiffs was a maneuver which took
many of the litigants by surprise, since the State had adopted a neutral position in the prior underground
river litigation. Questions were raised as to the State's ability to participate as a plaintiff in light of the
fact that it, also, had taken no action to regulate withdrawals from the Aquifer. Ultimately, Judge Bunton
realigned the State as defendants in the suit. The realignment, however, appears to have made no
difference in the positions being advocated by TWC and TPWD.
Intervenors on the defendant's side include agricultural interests, the City of San Antonio and San
Antonio Industrial/Commerce interests. The Edwards Underground Water District has been recognized
as having a neutral status and allowed to participate as an active amicus.
Early in January of 1992, defendant-intervenors' motion to dismiss the suit was filed, basically
stating that the court lacked jurisdiction since the ESA does not create a remedy to redress alleged failures
of the federal defendants to regulate the conduct of private parties, either through rulemalcing or
enforcement actions, and it does not create a remedy by which private citizens can compel the federal
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defendants to perform non-discretionary acts. The federal defendants also filed a motion to dismiss on
this date.
Trial, initially scheduled for December 23, 1992, was delayed in order to accommodate dismissal
motions and discovery. On March 2, 1992, Judge Bunton scheduled the case for trial ott May 4, 1992.
Discovery and trial preparation proceeded for that goal until the Texas Water Commission, on April 15,
1992, adopted Emergency Administrative Rules declaring that the Edwards Aquifer was an underground
river, subject to state regulation. Upon the basis of these rules, TWC requested a continuance of trial
until after August 3, 1992. In response to this Motion, the Court has rescheduled trial for August 10,
1992.
PART THREE:	 TWC ADMINISTRATIVE DECLARATION OF AN UNDERGROUND
RIVER, 31 TAC § 298.01, et seq. (17 Tex. Reg. 2913)
General Overview: 
Throughout the Endangered Species litigation, the Texas Water Commission has worked to
achieve a negotiated settlement of aquifer management issues. On April 2 of this year, TWC sent a letter
to "all the parties interested in the management of the Edwards Aquifer" offering for their consideration
and approval an agreement to manage the Aquifer. The groups offered an opportunity to sign-up as
parties to the agreement were the City of San Antonio, EUWD, Medina Underground Water Conservation
District, City of Uvalde and Uvalde County, and the Industrial Water Users Association. (A related
agreement was apparently being sought with GBRA.) This agreement was intended as an interim plan
until additional water could be brought on line, but represented a commitment to springflow of 100cfs
at Comal for at least 80% of the time; a commitment to proceed with water conservation and reuse
programs; a commitment to implement a regional drought management plan; a commitment to local
implementation and enforcement of the interim plan; funding support for finally establishing the feasibility
of artificially augmenting spring flow; and support for and participation in the process of establishing a
comprehensive, long-term water management plan for the south-central region of Texas. TWC demanded
for this agreement to be signed by April 14th.
No one signed TWC's proposed agreement.
Therefore, on April 15, 1992, the Texas Water Commission concluded that an emergency existed
requiring it to take immediate action in order to avoid federal intervention and regulation of Texas
groundwater. In response to this emergency, the Texas Water Commission adopted rules declaring its
conclusion that the Edwards Aquifer was an underground river and, therefore, subject to its regulatory
jurisdiction as state water. In order to avoid turning all existing well owners into criminal (by virtue of
their now illegal/unpermitted pumping of state water), the Water Commission temporarily authorized
continued use at existing and historic levels. At the same time, however, TWC declared a moratorium
on the drilling of all new wells in the Aquifer.
Litigation arising from TWC's "underground rules" is described below, to the date of writing this
	 (Th
paper. Additional developments, and in all likelihood, additional lawsuits, will have occurred by the time
of the conference.
Shortly after adoption of emergency rules, TWC proposed permit rules to govern use of water
from the Edwards Underground River. TWC anticipates holding numerous hearings on these rules, prior
to adopting permanent rules this summer.
TWC's proposed rules may be summarized as follows:
A.	 General Provisions.
1	 The Edwards Aquifer is declared to be an underground stream and defined to be state
water.
2.	 Since no claims were filed under the Water Rights Adjudication Act (1969 deadline),
none of the existing uses of the aquifer are legal—except livestock and domestic uses.
(Th
-12-
3. Since it is state water, the needs of in-stream flow, senior water rights, and springflows
may be considered (public trust doctrine) and any rights of use authorized may be subject
to restrictions to satisfy these needs.
Boundaries include only that portion of the Edwards east of a hydrologic divide near
Brackettville in Kinney County and south of another hydrologic divide near Kyle in Hays
County.
B.	 Permitting Uses from the Underground River.
I.	 TWC is issuing new permits. not adjudicating existing rights. 
2. All permit applications received by Sept. 1, 1992, will have a priority date of Sept. 1,
1992. [i.e., if you don't file by then, your right will be junior to everyone who does.]
3. Permits may be for a term of years or seasonal, instead of permanent. Permits will be
subject to conditions requiring conservation, springflow preservation, in-stream flows,
etc.
4. Permits will generally be based upon historic use, but will require submission of a
conservation plan to be approved by TWC; conservation and efficient use will be a major
focus of TWC permitting and supervision. Per capita use goals and irrigation efficiency
requirements will be imposed.
C.	 Conveying Rights in the Underground River.
I. Contractual sales of water for 3 years or less must be filed with the Commission and
approved. Permanent sales must also be filed and will present another opportunity for
imposition of conservation requirements.
2. WAGSTAFF ACT--The Wagstaff Act, as interpreted by this TWC rule, authorizes a
municipality to reappropriate water previously appropriated for a lesser use without
compensation. [It applies to all state water appropriations since 1931, and has never been
implemented because of the legal uncertainties.]
(i) "Further appropriation" under the Wagstaff Act is prohibited, except as approved
by TWC.
(ii) TWC, upon application, will authorize "further appropriation" under the
Wagstaff Act for municipalities demonstrating a genuine need, lack of other
alternative supply, and implementation of adequate conservation programs.
D.	 Water Use Measurement and Reporting--Meters are required by December 31, 1992, with annual
reports of water use during the prior calendar year to the TWC by March 1.
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E.	 Regulation of Diversion.
I.	 Waste is prohibited.
2.	 Diversions authorized by the permit are subject to limitation or curtailment by order of
TWC to maintain springflow, protect in-stream uses, protect bays and estuaries, etc.
F.	 Ten-Year Interim Plan.
1. Although a longer permit is authorized, the rules seem to contemplate that permits will
have a ten year term.
2. Total authorized diversions under the permits issued, with the September 1, 1992,
priority will be 400,000 af/yr, less anticipated domestic and livestock diversions.
3. TWC can declare an emergency (to springflow, aquatic habitat, etc.) and further limit
diversions, taking inta account the economic well-being of the region.
G.	 Local Government.
I.	 Upon request by a local government, TWC may delegate responsibilities under this
chapter.
2. In determining how much of the 400,000 af/yr to allocate to a particular region- over the 	 (Th
river, TWC will consider the recommendations of local governmental entities.
3. TWC may set up one or more watermasters to implement these requirements.
H.	 Permanent Management Plan
1. An advisory council is established consisting of TWC, TPWD, TWDB,
EUWCD, GBRA, SARA, NRA, and the Medina County Underground Water
Conservation District.
2. It will study all the issues pertaining to aquifer management and report to TWC
by September 1, 1994. TWC will review and act on recommendations by
January 1, 1995.
Status of Current Litigation
On April 15, 1992, immediately prior to the Commission action adopting emergency rules,
agricultural interests filed suit under the Texas Open Meetings Act to challenge the Commission action
and prevent violations of the Act's provisions requiring posting of notice seven (7) days prior to action
by an agency of statewide jurisdiction. McFadin. et al. v. Texas Water Commission. et  al., Cause No.
-14-
92-05214; In the District Court of Travis County, Texas. The Court denied the requested injunctive
relief due to the inability of named plaintiffs to demonstrate irreparable harm from the Commission's
emergency rules. l'he lawsuit remains pending. Should the Court conclude that the agency violated the
Open Meetings Act and adoption of emergency rules, they may be declared void.
The day following adoption of emergency rules by the Commission, GBRA filed suit requesting
a Declaratory Judgment of the rule's validity and confirming the Aquifer's status as an underground river.
Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority v. Texas Water Commission. et  al.; Cause No. 92-05226; In the
District Court of Travis County, Texas. Presumably in order to provide some adversity to the litigation,
GBRA amended its initial pleadings to name both agricultural interests and the City of San Antonio as
defendants in addition to TWC.
On May 15, 1992, the City of San Antonio and San Antonio Industrial interests each filed suit
in the District Court of Travis County, Texas challenging the validity of Texas Water Commission
Underground River Rules. City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Commission; Cause No. 92-07029; In
the District Court of Travis County, Texas. Redland Stone Products. Inc.. Southwest Research Institute,
and United States Automobile Association v. Texas Water Commission; Cause No. 92-07042; In the
District Court of Travis County, Texas. Additionally, Medina County has authorized suit against TWC
to contest the rules.
Although not filed at the time of this writing, rumblings can be heard from Medina and Uvalde
County property owners -- rumblings about clouds on title to real property and taking of private property
for public use without compensation.
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PART FOUR: CONCLUSION / PROSPECTS
Perhaps the only conclusion upon which all parties to the current controversies agree is that the
current situation cannot continue. The litigation needs to stop, if for no other reason than the
unproductive costs.
Even if the Aquifer is determined not to be an underground river, and the Endangered Species
Act is determined not to best groundwater regulatory authority in the federal government, a serious
problem remains. Current and foreseeable demands on the Aquifer may well exceed its supply capability.
Under drought conditions, absent successful springilow augmentation or other mitigation, endangered
species are likely to suffer.
If there is a "win-win" solution to Edward Aquifer problems, the parties have been unable to
discover it to date. Likewise, a reasonable intermediate negotiative solution has eluded the parties to
date. As the litigation continues, incentives grow to find a solution.
